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DEBATE 
FIRST AMENDMENT LIMITS ON THE REGULATION OF 
JUDICIAL CAMPAIGN SPEECH:  DEFINING THE  
GOVERNMENT’S INTEREST 
What does it mean for a judge’s campaign speech to be impartial?  
More importantly, how far may a state go in regulating judicial cam-
paign speech in order to ensure impartiality without violating the First 
Amendment?  In this Debate, Professor Paul E. McGreal, of the 
Southern Illinois University School of Law, and Dean James J. Alfini, 
of the South Texas College of Law, explore the permissible limits on 
judicial campaign speech in light of the Supreme Court’s First 
Amendment campaign speech precedent. 
 Using the Court’s 2002 decision, Republican Party of Minnesota v. 
White, as a starting point, Professor McGreal argues two points:  first,  
that, for First Amendment purposes, impartiality should be limited to 
mean only that “a judge will make decisions using the accepted meth-
ods of legal analysis;” and second, that campaign promises of specific 
types of performance once elected “do not necessarily compromise 
judicial impartiality.”  Politics, in McGreal’s view, is a necessary part of 
judicial elections, and “the First Amendment does not allow the state 
to “wring[] politics out of the political process.”  Thus, according to 
McGreal, as long as a judge’s campaign speech expresses an accepted 
form of legal analysis, that speech may not be regulated without violat-
ing the judicial candidate’s First Amendment rights.   
Dean Alfini, on the other hand, would require a more stringent 
regulation of campaign speech and would base such restrictions on 
the ABA’s formulation that judges may not “make pledges, promises, 
or commitments” in their campaign that would compromise their im-
partiality.  McGreal’s more permissive rule, Alfini asserts, would 
“threaten the due process rights of parties who may come before” 
elected judges, thus potentially “compromis[ing] their duty and ability 
to uphold the rule of law in our democratic society.”  The test for im-
partiality, then, should focus on “the due process rights of parties,” 
and judges should not be granted McGreal’s broader First Amend-
ment protections.  Campaign restrictions, then, should be “narrowly 
tailored to prohibit prejudgment promises.” 
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OPENING STATEMENT 
Defining Judicial Impartiality:  The  
Problem of Campaign Promises 
Paul E. McGreal† 
What does it mean for a judge to be “impartial”?  The United 
States Supreme Court faced this seemingly simple question in Republi-
can Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002).  White involved the 
“announce clause” of the Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct, which 
prohibited judicial candidates from announcing their views on issues 
likely to come before the court for which they were a candidate.  The 
Minnesota announce clause was a fairly typical provision, with thirteen 
states then having similar prohibitions.  Minnesota defended the an-
nounce clause as necessary to preserve the impartiality of its judges.  
The problem, as the Court learned, is that Minnesota—like other 
states with similar provisions—did not specify what “impartiality” 
meant.  Instead, Minnesota simply identified campaign behavior that 
it did not like—such as announcements of legal views—and then as-
serted by ipse dixit that such conduct compromised impartiality. 
The Court held that the announce clause violated the First 
Amendment’s free speech guarantee.  While White’s holding is limited 
to the announce clause, the case spurred many states to re-examine 
how they regulate judicial campaign speech more generally.  Not sur-
prisingly, most states revised or repealed their version of the an-
nounce clause.  Some states, however, chose to retain a more common 
campaign regulation that was not at issue in White :  a general prohibi-
tion of campaign promises.  These states seem confident that such 
promises compromise judicial impartiality. 
This Opening Statement makes two related points.  First, for pur-
poses of First Amendment analysis, judicial impartiality should mean 
simply that a judge will make decisions using the accepted methods of 
legal analysis.  Part II develops this point.  Second, candidate promises 
of performance in office do not necessarily compromise judicial im- 
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partiality.  Consequently, state rules that ban such promises, like their 
cousin the announce clause, violate the First Amendment.  Part III 
develops this second point.  But first, Part I briefly describes the 
Court’s decision in White. 
I.  WHITE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT FRAMEWORK 
Under the First Amendment, the announce clause received strict 
scrutiny—the most stringent test in constitutional law—because it was 
a content-based restriction of political speech.  Strict scrutiny required 
Minnesota, first, to identify a compelling interest for banning the an-
nouncement of a candidate’s views, and, second, to show that the an-
nounce clause was narrowly tailored to that interest.  Minnesota ar-
gued that the announce clause served a compelling interest in 
preserving judicial impartiality.  The problem with this argument was 
that the meaning of impartiality is not self evident, and Minnesota had 
not offered a definition.  This omission led the Court to hypothesize 
three possible meanings:  party neutrality, issue impartiality, and 
open-mindedness. 
The White Court easily dismissed the first two versions of impartial-
ity.  First, the Court rejected party impartiality, which means that 
judges shall not indulge “bias against [a] party, or favoritism toward 
the other party,”  because the announce clause was not narrowly tai-
lored to this interest:  the clause proscribed “speech for or against par-
ticular issues,” not “speech for or against particular parties.”  White, 536 
U.S. at 776.  Second, the Court rejected issue impartiality, which it 
took to mean “lack of preconception in favor of or against a particular 
legal view,” as “neither possible nor desirable.”  Id. at 777-78.  It is im-
possible to find lawyers with no views on the law, and even if we could, 
we would not want these lawyers as judges. 
The third version of impartiality—open-mindedness—means that 
“a judge [must] be willing to consider views that oppose his precon-
ceptions, and remain open to persuasion, when the issues arise in a 
pending case.”  Id. at 778.  The Court also described open-mindedness 
as requiring that a judge be free “from pressure to rule a certain way.”  
Id.  The White Court concluded that Minnesota’s announce clause was 
not intended to promote open-mindedness, and so it never explained 
what this version of impartiality entails.  Part II uses open-mindedness 
as a springboard for developing a new definition of impartiality. 
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II. IMPARTIALITY AND THE JUDICIAL ROLE 
The first question is whether impartiality requires a judge to be 
equally open to all legal arguments.  The answer must be “no,” as 
many legal doctrines and practices require a judge to close her mind, in 
whole or in part, to certain legal arguments.  For example, the doc-
trine of stare decisis requires a lower-court judge to reject arguments 
to overrule, modify, or ignore existing precedent of a higher court.  
Similarly, procedure and ethics rules bar lawyers from making—and 
judges from crediting—frivolous legal arguments.  Because judges 
may properly close their minds to some legal arguments, “open-
mindedness” does not helpfully describe what we expect of judges. 
A workable definition of impartiality, then, must distinguish be-
tween proper and improper influences on judicial decision making.  
To do so, we must have a conception of how judges ought to behave, 
including the matters, sources, and arguments that may properly in-
fluence a judge’s decision.  A judge who stays within this role will be 
impartial, while a judge who acts outside this role will not. 
In defining the judicial role, we must keep in mind the reason for 
doing so.  Recall that our task is to define the state’s compelling inter-
est in judicial impartiality, which will be used in First Amendment 
free-speech analysis.  Because impartiality is rooted in due process, 
states asserting that interest are invoking a concept of constitutional 
meaning and origin.  For this reason, our analysis should look to the 
Constitution’s conception of the judicial role. 
As I have argued elsewhere, the Constitution assumes that judges 
should act like lawyers in performing their jobs.  See Paul E. McGreal, 
Ambition’s Playground, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1107, 1143-85 (2000); Paul 
E. McGreal, Impeachment as a Remedy for Ethical Violations, 41 S. TEX. L. 
REV. 1369 (2000).  As a professional community, lawyers recognize 
certain methods of reasoning and thinking as permissible.  As judges 
are expected to come from the legal community, the profession’s 
norms and practices would limit and control judges’ decision making.  
To take an extreme example, a judge who decides cases by flipping a 
coin, or based on litigants’ hair colors, would surely, and rightly, be 
criticized. 
The next question is whether it matters that a judge’s legal analy-
sis is influenced by the pressure of political accountability.  For exam-
ple, suppose that an appellate judge believes there are nonfrivolous 
legal grounds to rule for either party to an appeal, but that she also 
believes ruling for the petitioner would be unpopular with the elec-
torate.  Assume that the electorate’s opinion influences either the 
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judge’s decision or how the judge writes her opinion.  Is such political 
pressure an improper influence on a judge’s decision making? 
The answer must be “no” if we are to retain judicial elections.  In-
deed, a contrary answer ignores the elephant in the room:  public ac-
countability certainly influences the behavior of judges who must 
stand for reelection.  The admitted reason for having incumbent 
judges stand for reelection is to allow voters to turn unsatisfactory 
judges out of office, with incumbent judges evaluated based on their 
performance in office.  Nothing in law, logic, or experience prevents 
voters from evaluating a judge’s substantive rulings or legal views.  Re-
alizing that voters will do so, a judge will at least consider that fact in 
making judicial rulings.  As Justice O’Connor noted in her concurring 
opinion in White, “[e]lected judges cannot help being aware that if the 
public is not satisfied with the outcome of a particular case, it could 
hurt their reelection prospects.”  White, 536 U.S. at 789 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring).  In short, if impartiality asks us to bar any political influ-
ence on judicial decision making, we crossed that Rubicon with the 
adoption of judicial elections. 
III.  CAMPAIGN PROMISES DO NOT VIOLATE IMPARTIALITY 
The preceding discussion has defined a version of impartiality that 
can serve as a compelling state interest for regulating judicial cam-
paign speech:  judges must decide cases through the legally pre-
scribed processes, using the accepted sources and methods of legal 
analysis.  Further, political accountability may permissibly influence 
the judge’s selection or discussion of legal analysis.  The last question 
is whether a campaign promise would violate this understanding of 
impartiality. 
To see how my version of impartiality would apply to campaign 
promises, consider the hypothetical case of State v. Smith.  Smith was 
convicted of child molestation, and his conviction was upheld on di-
rect appeal.  While Smith is now within six months of completing his 
sentence, the state has recently enacted a violent sexual predator law 
that allows continued civil detention of child molesters who are found 
beyond a reasonable doubt to constitute a continuing threat to soci-
ety.  The United States Supreme Court has held that such civil deten-
tion statutes do not violate the United States Constitution.  See Kansas 
v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 369 (1997).  Smith has brought suit in state 
court arguing that the statute violates the due process provision of the 
state constitution.  Both the state trial court and court of appeals 
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agreed, striking down the civil detention law.  The state has appealed 
to the state supreme court where the case is now pending. 
Assume that a candidate for the state supreme court is asked 
about the pending appeal in State v. Smith, and the candidate says, “I 
have studied the text, history, and purposes of the state constitution, 
and if elected, I promise to decide the case against Smith.”  This 
statement, though barred by most state prohibitions of campaign 
promises, would not violate my version of impartiality.  The candidate 
has promised to make her decision based on accepted legal sources—
the State Constitution’s text, structure, and history.  The fact that the 
pressure of political accountability may affect her willingness to depart 
from that legal analysis does not affect the candidate’s impartiality.  
Thus, banning such a promise would violate the First Amendment be-
cause doing so would not serve the state’s interest in preserving judi-
cial impartiality. 
A more difficult question arises if the candidate simply says, “I 
promise to rule against Smith.”  Because this statement does not ex-
plain the basis for the judge’s prospective decision, the statement 
alone does not indicate whether the candidate’s promise is based on 
extra legal grounds.  Does the First Amendment protect such a naked 
promise? 
The Supreme Court’s decision Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1975), 
suggests that the candidate would be protected.  There, the Court ad-
dressed a federal campaign-finance law that limited a person’s inde-
pendent campaign expenditures in support of a candidate (i.e., ex-
penditures that support, but are not coordinated with, a candidate).  
Congress had argued that the limit was needed to prevent bribery, as a 
person might make independent expenditures in exchange for a can-
didate’s express or implied promise of action in office.  The Court 
held that a limit on independent expenditures was not narrowly tai-
lored to the prevention of bribery.  Because independent expendi-
tures did not raise an unavoidable inference of bribery, existing brib-
ery laws could adequately guard against corruption.  A prophylactic 
measure was only appropriate when the challenged conduct was likely 
to threaten the government’s interest. 
So, does a naked judicial campaign promise raise an unavoidable 
inference that the candidate will make decisions on extra legal 
grounds?  My tentative answer is “no.”  The public knows that the or-
dinary work of judges includes applying the law, and they likely view 
judicial campaign promises in that context.  Further, under Buckley 
and White, the state bears the burden of proving that the electorate 
would necessarily draw the forbidden inference.  My suspicion is that 
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states possess no relevant evidence at this point, given that most states 
merely adopted a version of the American Bar Association’s Model 
Judicial Code with little (if any) empirical study. 
CONCLUSION 
State regulations of judicial campaign speech rest on an unexam-
ined premise:  political influence impermissibly interferes with judicial 
impartiality.  Perhaps because this premise fatally undermines the en-
tire enterprise of judicial elections, states have not developed a fully 
formed definition of impartiality.  This Opening Statement attempts 
to do so and explains how this definition undercuts the constitutional-
ity of a mainstay of current judicial campaign regulations—the prohi-
bition on campaign promises.  As long as a candidate’s promise of 
performance in office is based on an express or implied legal analysis, 
the First Amendment bars states from punishing the candidate’s 
speech. 
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REBUTTAL 
Judicial Impartiality as a Compelling State Interest:   
A Defense of Current Restrictions on  
Judicial Campaign Speech 
James J. Alfini† 
This Rebuttal argues that the basic restriction on judicial cam-
paign speech as enunciated in the current American Bar Association 
(ABA) Model Code of Judicial Conduct is appropriate on both phi-
losophical and constitutional grounds, particularly in its reliance on 
the protection of judicial impartiality.  The ABA Model Code restric-
tion reads, in pertinent part:  “a judicial candidate shall not . . . in 
connection with cases, controversies, or issues that are likely to come 
before the court, make pledges, promises, or commitments that are 
inconsistent with the impartial performance of the adjudicative duties 
of judicial office.”  MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT R. 4.1 (2007).  The 
2007 ABA Model Code defines impartial as the “absence of bias or 
prejudice in favor of, or against, particular parties or classes of parties, 
as well as maintenance of an open mind in considering issues that may 
come before a judge.”  MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Terminology 
(2007).  In his Opening Statement, Professor McGreal disagrees with 
this formulation, arguing for a much more limited definition of judi-
cial impartiality that would preclude most, if not all, restrictions on 
judicial campaign speech. 
The concept of judicial impartiality is at the center of this Debate, 
as Professor McGreal makes clear in his Opening Statement.  He ac-
curately notes that too little attention has been paid to defining judi-
cial impartiality but mistakenly takes a minimalist approach to correct-
ing this problem.  Unlike Professor McGreal, I believe that judicial 
candidates who “make pledges, promises, or commitments that are in-
consistent with the impartial performance of the adjudicative duties of 
judicial office” threaten the due process rights of parties who may 
come before them and compromise their duty and ability to uphold 
the rule of law in our democratic society.  For the sake of consistency,  
†
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this Rebuttal to Professor McGreal’s analysis will adopt the structure 
used in his Opening Statement by addressing the First Amendment 
framework first, followed by issues relating to the judicial role. 
I.  WHITE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT FRAMEWORK 
At the outset, it should be noted that I agree with the outcome in 
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White that the “announce clause,” a 
provision in the 1972 version of the ABA Model Code of Judicial Con-
duct, is unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds.  Because of 
concerns over the constitutionality of the “announce clause,” the ABA 
had removed the “announce clause” from its Model Code of Judicial 
Conduct in 1990.  Only nine states, including Minnesota, still had the 
announce clause in their judicial ethics canons at the time of the deci-
sion in White in 2002.  See Cynthia Gray, The Good News in Republican 
Party of Minnesota v. White, 87 JUDICATURE 271, 271 (2004).  In pro-
hibiting announcing one’s views on all “disputed legal and political 
issues,” White, 536 U.S. at 768, the code restriction sweeps too broadly, 
prohibiting both protected and unprotected speech, and is thus not 
narrowly tailored to serve the compelling state interest in an impartial 
judiciary. 
Where Professor McGreal’s constitutional analysis goes wrong is in 
his insistence in lumping the announce clause with the clauses pro-
hibiting “pledges,” “promises,” and “commitments” in the 1990 and 
2007 versions of the ABA Model Code.  A careful reading of the White 
decision would lead one to conclude that these campaign speech pro-
visions are still viable.  At the time of the White decision, the 1990 ver-
sion of the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct had a clause prohib-
iting “pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the faithful 
and impartial performance of the duties of the office” and another 
clause prohibiting “statements that commit or appear to commit the 
candidate with respect to cases, controversies or issues that are likely 
to come before the court.”  MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 
5(A)(3)(d) (1990).  With regard to the “pledges or promises” clause, 
Justice Scalia, the author of the five-person majority opinion in White, 
ducked the issue by stating the clause is “a prohibition that is not chal-
lenged here and on which we express no view.”  White, 536 U.S. at 770.  
As to the “commit clause,” the Court again avoids the issue by stating,  
“We do not know whether the announce clause (as interpreted by 
state authorities) and the 1990 ABA Canon [the commit clause] are 
one in the same.  No aspect of our constitutional analysis turns on this 
question.”  Id. at 774 n.5. 
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Professor McGreal would be quick to point out, however, that at-
tempts to conclude that the White decision leaves the current Code re-
strictions intact fails to reckon with certain aspects of the Court’s 
analysis.  Although the Court explicitly declined to rule on the consti-
tutionality of the pledges-or-promises and commit clauses, both of 
these provisions are, like the “announce clause,” content-based restric-
tions on a candidate’s speech and would therefore be subject to strict 
scrutiny if challenged in subsequent cases.  That is, defenders of these 
provisions would have the burden of showing that they are narrowly 
tailored to serve a compelling state interest.  Although the White deci-
sion rests on the Court’s unremarkable conclusion that the “an-
nounce clause” is overbroad, Professor McGreal would argue that Jus-
tice Scalia’s majority opinion brings into question the state’s argument 
that the “announce clause” restriction, or presumably any other con-
tent-based speech restriction, is justified because of the state’s compel-
ling interest in preserving judicial impartiality and the appearance of 
impartiality, particularly if one accepts his limited definition of impar-
tiality. 
Again, however, Professor McGreal’s analysis fails to distinguish 
between the “announce clause” on the one hand and the pledges, 
promises, and commitments clauses on the other hand. The distin-
guishing characteristic is prejudgment.  A candidate for judicial office 
does not prejudge a case when he or she announces his or her views 
on a disputed legal or political issue.  The candidate does prejudge a 
case when the candidate pledges, promises, or commits to decide a 
case or class of cases in a particular way.  Prejudgment compromises 
the judge’s ability to be impartial, a compelling governmental interest 
in a representative democracy. 
Indeed, Justice Scalia has demonstrated a personal concern over 
the appearance of prejudgment by recusing himself in a post-White 
case in which his impartiality might reasonably have been questioned.  
See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004).  The case 
involved the constitutionality of the words “under God” in the Pledge 
of Allegiance.  Prior to oral argument before the Supreme Court, Jus-
tice Scalia made a speech in which he appeared to criticize the lower-
court opinion in the case.  He subsequently removed himself from the 
case because of the appearance of prejudgment. 
II.  IMPARTIALITY AND THE JUDICIAL ROLE 
Professor McGreal’s limited definition of impartiality is flawed be-
cause it adopts a minimalist conception of the judicial role that is not 
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in keeping with the notion that the judge is the guardian of the rule 
of law in our society.  Judicial impartiality requires much more of a 
judge than simply analyzing cases like a lawyer.  It requires a commit-
ment to guarantee the due process rights of litigants that come before 
the judge.  Even if we were to adopt the McGreal (analyzing like a law-
yer) conception of the judicial role, however, Professor McGreal con-
veniently forgets that lawyers are also the guardians of the rule of law 
in our society.  Analyzing like a lawyer should also include thinking 
and acting in a way that advances the rule of law. 
Prejudgment is inimical to the rule of law.  Again, when a judge 
makes a pledge, promise, or commitment to rule in a certain way dur-
ing the course of a judicial election campaign, the judge has effec-
tively prejudged that case or class of cases, compromising his or her 
ability to be impartial.  Proponents of campaign-speech restrictions 
argue that the need to maintain judicial impartiality is the main factor 
that distinguishes judicial election campaigns from those of other 
elected officials.  Speaking through Justice Stevens, the four dissenting 
Justices in White added their voices to the impartiality chorus:  “By ob-
scuring the fundamental distinction between campaigns for the judi-
ciary and the political branches . . . the Court defies any sensible no-
tion of the judicial office and the importance of impartiality in that 
context.”  White, 536 U.S. at 797 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
Although “judicial impartiality” is widely viewed as a core value in 
the American system of justice, this concept cannot be adequately un-
derstood or defined unless one considers the related concepts of “ju-
dicial independence” and the “rule of law.”  The notion that we are 
committed to the rule of law is an essential norm in our representative 
democracy.  Judicial independence and judicial impartiality are in-
strumental values that support and preserve the basic rule-of-law 
norm.  And, indeed, the values of judicial independence and judicial 
impartiality are inextricably intertwined.  Both play essential roles in 
judicial decision making in a democratic society.  Judicial independ-
ence calls upon judges to be free of outside influences so that they 
may decide cases impartially. 
In this postrealist era, it would be folly to argue that the values of 
judicial independence and judicial impartiality can be maintained in 
their absolute sense.  Judges usually come to the bench after legal ca-
reers and public involvement that shape their views of the law.  How-
ever, it is hard to believe that the vast majority of judges, elected or 
appointed, would abuse their independence or compromise their im-
partiality by regularly implementing personal or political agendas 
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rather than adhering to the rule-of-law norm.  Even though judges 
may have certain moral values and political views, these values are in-
formed and tempered by a basic understanding and appreciation of 
the core democratic values of the rule of law and judicial independ-
ence and impartiality.  They are keenly aware that bias, prejudice, and 
prejudgment are inimical to the administration of justice in a repre-
sentative democracy. 
In arguing for a narrow definition of judicial impartiality, Profes-
sor McGreal uses the example of a candidate who makes a pledge—
explained or “naked”—to rule in a certain way in a case that is pend-
ing before the court to which the judge is seeking to be elected.  He 
asks us first to assume a candidate who says that she has studied the 
case and promises if elected to decide against the defendant.  He 
states that such a promise would not violate his conception of imparti-
ality, because the candidate has used accepted standards of legal 
analysis to prejudge the case.  He then offers a second scenario where 
the candidate makes a “naked” promise to rule against the defendant.  
That is, the candidate does not indicate that she has analyzed the case 
and the promise may therefore have been made on “extra legal 
grounds.”  Although Professor McGreal believes that this second sce-
nario presents “a more difficult question,” he believes the candidate 
would be protected under Buckley v. Valeo.  In Buckley, the Supreme 
Court ruled that a limitation on campaign expenditures was not nar-
rowly tailored to accomplish the state’s interest in preventing bribery. 
In both McGreal scenarios, the candidate has violated the due 
process rights of the defendant by prejudging the case.  Due process 
requires that a defendant will have the right to have his or her case 
heard in an adversarial context by an impartial (open-minded) judge.  
In both scenarios, the judge has prematurely closed his or her mind 
and can thus no longer be considered to be impartial.  That is, regard-
less of the arguments presented by the defendant’s lawyers in open 
court, the judge will rule against the defendant.  Therefore, a prohibi-
tion against campaign promises would be narrowly tailored to accom-
plish the compelling state interest in an impartial judiciary.  Unlike 
Buckley, where independent expenditures did not necessarily raise an 
inference of bribery, the inference of prejudgment and judicial parti-
ality in McGreal’s scenarios is inescapable. 
Moreover, the McGreal campaign scenarios are highly unlikely.  It 
is unlikely that a case suitable for a campaign promise will conven-
iently be pending in the judge’s jurisdiction.  More likely, is a scenario 
where a “law and order” candidate who, in his or her zeal to get a 
tough-on-crime message across, explicitly or implicitly promises to fa-
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vor law enforcement agencies in deciding cases, thus prejudging cases 
brought by those agencies.  Similarly, candidates courting sizable 
campaign contributions from big-business interests on the one hand 
or the plaintiffs’ bar on the other may make statements indicating that 
the candidates will favor those interests in cases that come before 
them if elected. 
CONCLUSION 
Restrictions on judicial campaign speech, anchored in a broad no-
tion of judicial impartiality, are essential to preserve core values such 
as the rule of law in our representative democracy.  Tests to determine 
the constitutional limits of judicial campaign-speech restrictions 
should focus on the due process rights of litigants that may come be-
fore the judge, not simply whether a judge has employed accepted 
standards of legal analysis. 
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CLOSING STATEMENT 
“Then Don’t Elect Judges!” 
Paul E. McGreal 
Dean James Alfini’s response reminded me of an old Henny 
Youngman joke.  A patient goes to a doctor’s office and tells the doc-
tor, “It hurts when I do this.”  The doctor looks at the patient and says, 
“Then don’t do that!” 
Like Youngman’s patient, the legal profession has long com-
plained, “Judges aren’t impartial when they are elected.”  Like the 
doctor, our reply ought to be, “Then don’t elect judges!” 
Unlike Youngman’s patient, however, the legal profession cannot 
control the behavior it complains of.  A state’s highest court typically 
establishes the state’s rules of judicial ethics, and the state’s constitu-
tion sets forth the process for selecting judges.  So while the profes-
sion has long opposed judicial elections, most states persist in the 
practice.  Nonetheless, the profession tries its best to subvert judicial 
elections by severely limiting judicial campaign speech.  Justice Scalia 
made this point in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White: 
There is an obvious tension between the article of Minnesota’s popularly 
approved Constitution which provides that judges shall be elected, and 
the Minnesota Supreme Court’s announce clause which places most sub-
jects of interest to the voters off limits. . . . The disparity is perhaps un-
surprising, since the ABA, which originated the announce clause, has 
long been an opponent of judicial elections. . . . That opposition may be 
well taken (it certainly had the support of the Founders of the Federal 
Government), but the First Amendment does not permit it to achieve its 
goal by leaving the principle of elections in place while preventing can-
didates from discussing what the elections are about.  “[T]he greater 
power to dispense with elections altogether does not include the lesser 
power to conduct elections under conditions of state-imposed voter ig-
norance.  If the State chooses to tap the energy and the legitimizing 
power of the democratic process, it must accord the participants in that 
process . . . the First Amendment rights that attach to their roles.” 
536 U.S. 765, 787-88 (2002) (citing Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 349 
(1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).  In short, the First Amendment 
does not allow the profession to undermine judicial elections by 
wringing politics out of the political process. 
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Dean Alfini’s Rebuttal fails for the same reason that Justice  
Scalia criticized the ABA.  By focusing on political influence, open-
mindedness, and judicial independence, he defines impartiality so 
that the ordinary influence of electoral accountability would make an 
elected judge not impartial.  As long as states may choose to elect their 
judges, the states’ interest in regulating judicial elections must as-
sume—expressly or implicitly—the permissibility of that choice.  That 
is, the state must define impartiality so that an elected judge can be 
impartial. 
To be clear, I do not argue that Dean Alfini engages in the intel-
lectual subterfuge of which Justice Scalia accused the ABA—i.e., using 
regulation of judicial campaign speech to frustrate judicial elections.  
Rather, while he aims at taming improper influences on elected 
judges, his argument, followed to its logical conclusion, would have 
that effect.  The remainder of this Closing Statement develops this 
point. 
I.  ALFINI ON IMPARTIALITY 
My Opening Statement began with a straightforward question:  
What does it mean for a judge to be “impartial”?  I criticized states for 
invoking an undefined interest in impartiality because, without a con-
crete idea of what impartiality means, states cannot identify campaign 
behavior that compromises judicial impartiality.  While Dean Alfini 
concedes that states have been unhelpful in defining impartiality, his 
response does not so much define the term as weave together threads 
of related concepts.  In places he describes impartiality as not prejudg-
ing a case, in other places as a commitment to the rule of law, and in 
still other places as judicial independence or open-mindedness. 
In divining Dean Alfini’s definition of impartiality, a sensible place 
to start is his quotation of the 2007 ABA Model Code’s definition of 
the term:  “absence of bias or prejudice in favor of, or against, particu-
lar parties or classes of parties, as well as maintenance of an open 
mind in considering issues that may come before a judge.”  This defi-
nition has two parts:  first, bias and prejudice against parties or classes 
of parties, and, second, open-mindedness.  The former is entirely con-
sistent with my definition of impartiality, and the latter does not pro-
vide a workable definition of impartiality.  The next two Parts explain 
these points. 
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II.  BIAS AND PREJUDICE 
Bias or prejudice against a party or class of parties—what I re-
ferred to in my Opening Statement as “party impartiality”—was one of 
the compelling interests examined in White.  The Minnesota an-
nounce clause did not serve this interest because it barred speech on 
issues, not parties.  My definition of impartiality, which requires judges 
to make decisions based on the accepted methods of legal reasoning, 
is consistent with party impartiality.  A judge who decides a case based 
on party bias or prejudice is not deciding based on accepted legal 
analysis, and so would not be impartial.  Thus, I agree that states have 
a compelling interest in banning campaign speech that suggests or 
promises decisions based on party bias or prejudice. 
III.  OPEN-MINDEDNESS 
The ABA Model Code also defines impartiality to require open-
mindedness.  While Dean Alfini never specifically explains what judi-
cial open-mindedness entails, his discussion leaves two possibilities:  
judicial independence and lack of prejudgment.  The former is con-
sistent with my definition of impartiality, and the latter is really an at-
tack on judicial elections.  The next two sections explain these points. 
A.  Open-Mindedness as Judicial Independence 
According to Dean Alfini, “[ j]udicial independence calls upon 
judges to be free of outside influences so that they may decide cases 
impartially.”  My Opening Statement, however, explained that the 
mere use of judicial elections, and the fact that a judge stands for re-
election, necessarily inserts the influence of political accountability 
into the process of judicial decision making.  Elected judges surely re-
alize that voters will scrutinize their decisions at the next election and 
at least consider that fact in making judicial rulings.  And this influ-
ence exists regardless of what a candidate says during her campaign. 
Dean Alfini acknowledges that we cannot achieve judicial inde-
pendence in an absolute sense.  He notes that a lawyer’s life experi-
ences shape her legal views, and that such influence is permissible.  
He instead objects to judges “implementing personal or political 
agendas rather than adhering to the rule-of-law norm.”  But my view 
of impartiality would also reject such influences.  This is because a 
judge who implements a personal or political agenda would not be 
deciding based on legal analysis. 
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B.  Open-Mindedness as Lack of Prejudgment 
Next, consider prejudgment, which Dean Alfini considers “inimi-
cal to the rule of law.”  He uses prejudgment to mean that, “regardless 
of the arguments presented by [a party’s] lawyers in open court, the 
judge will rule against [that party].”  There are three problems with 
this definition of prejudgment.  First, it does not accurately describe 
how campaign promises affect judicial behavior.  To see this, consider 
my hypothetical candidate who promises to rule for the State in the 
pending appeal of State v. Smith.  What makes this promise arguably 
binding is the threat that voters will not reelect a judge who breaks a 
campaign promise.  But voters will not necessarily act in that manner.  
As Justice Scalia noted in White, voters view campaign promises skepti-
cally: 
Justice Stevens asserts that statements made in an election campaign 
pose a special threat to openmindedness because the candidate, when 
elected judge, will have a particular reluctance to contradict them.  That 
might be plausible, perhaps, with regard to campaign promises.  A candi-
date who says “If elected, I will vote to uphold the legislature’s power to 
prohibit same-sex marriages” will positively be breaking his word if he 
does not do so (although one would be naive not to recognize that campaign 
promises are—by long democratic tradition—the least binding form of human 
commitment). 
White, 536 U.S. at 780 (citation omitted) (final emphasis added).  Un-
der the First Amendment, the state must show that campaign prom-
ises lead to prejudgment; they cannot merely rest on the “naïve” as-
sumption that promises do so. 
Second, we do not expect judges to be free from prejudgment of 
legal issues.  For example, consider the issue of the constitutional 
right to terminate a pregnancy.  Do any constitutional lawyers or 
commentators believe that all nine of the Supreme Court’s current 
Justices are “open” to arguments for or against the recognition of such 
a right?  Surely not.  Indeed, lawyers and commentators speak and act 
as if several of the Justices will rule one way or the other “regardless of 
the arguments presented by [a party’s] lawyers in open court.”  For 
example, it is common to refer to a Justice(s) as the Court’s “swing 
vote(s).”  Doing so only makes sense if we have a reliable prediction of 
how the remaining Justices will vote on a given issue.  Nonetheless, we 
just as surely (and rightly) consider those remaining Justices to be im-
partial, because their prejudgment is based on the law, and not on 
impermissible, extra legal grounds. 
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Third, because Dean Alfini does not distinguish permissible and 
impermissible reasons for prejudgment, he implicitly condemns judi-
cial elections generally.  Recall that a campaign promise will influence 
a judge’s behavior (if at all) through the threat of voter backlash if the 
judge breaks the promise.  Thus, anticipated voter reaction—and not 
the promise itself—influences the judge’s behavior.  But even absent a 
campaign promise, the anticipated views of the voters will encourage 
certain substantive judicial decisions.  That is, the pressure for re-
election will influence the judge’s decision making, and thus cause a 
degree of prejudgment, regardless of what the judge says during the 
campaign.  Indeed, if public opinion changes so that fulfilling the 
promise would be unpopular, political accountability would encour-
age the judge to break the campaign promise.  In short, pressure to-
ward prejudgment is inherent in judicial elections. 
In the end, prejudgment, standing alone, does not compromise 
impartiality.  Rather, only prejudgment for impermissible reasons does so.  
Dean Alfini’s response treats as impermissible the influence exerted 
by political accountability.  This objection, though, is to the entire en-
terprise of judicial elections.  If Dean Alfini accepts the constitutional-
ity of judicial elections, then he must accept the influence inherent in 
that system. 
CONCLUSION 
Whether rule of law, judicial independence, open-mindedness, or 
lack of prejudgment, Dean Alfini’s version of impartiality is not as 
much about judicial campaign speech as it is judicial elections.  It may 
well be that, as some commentators have suggested, judicial elections 
violate due process.  But until the Court so holds, states may choose 
how to select their judges.  Because the approach described in Dean 
Alfini’s response has the latter effect, it cannot inoculate state judicial 
campaign regulations against First Amendment challenge. 
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CLOSING STATEMENT 
Prejudment Promises Have No Place in  
Judicial Election Campaigns 
James J. Alfini 
In his Closing Statement, Professor McGreal initially shifts the fo-
cus from impartiality to judicial elections.  This shift is not inappro-
priate since it is the White case, the “announce clause,” and judicial 
campaign speech that are the catalysts for this debate.  In the course 
of presenting his arguments, Professor McGreal accuses me (implicitly 
or as a fellow traveler of the ABA) of (1) not liking judicial elections, 
(2) believing that elected judges cannot be impartial, and (3) using 
campaign-speech restrictions as a subterfuge to defeat judicial elec-
tions.  He then returns to the subject of judicial impartiality and quib-
bles with my definition for not being “workable.”  He ends by focusing 
on my concerns over prejudgment and criticizes me for failing to “dis-
tinguish between permissible and impermissible reasons for prejudg-
ment.”  I will respond to his concerns in this order and then offer my 
closing thoughts. 
I.  JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 
As far as Professor McGreal’s suggestion that I don’t like judicial 
elections is concerned, let me be explicit:  I don’t like judicial elec-
tions.  They typically are low-visibility affairs with voters having little or 
no knowledge of the qualifications of the candidates, regardless of re-
strictions on campaign speech.  It is doubtful that lifting restrictions 
on judicial campaign speech would result in greater voter interest in 
these contests.  More important for purposes of this Debate, judicial 
elections raise concerns over a candidate’s ability to be impartial when 
he or she takes the bench.  The candidate is required to raise money 
and seek support if he or she has any hope of winning, raising impar-
tiality concerns after he or she takes the bench when individuals or in-
terests that were supportive of the campaign come before him or her.  
This is exactly why the codes of judicial conduct in elective states im-
pose restrictions such as the use of campaign finance committees to 
insulate the candidates from contributors and narrowly drawn speech 
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restrictions to eliminate the temptations of making prejudgment 
promises. 
Professor McGreal’s contention that my attitude towards judicial 
elections means that I don’t believe elected judges can be impartial is 
incorrect.  I respect the policy choices that states have made in decid-
ing to elect all or some of their judges.  I also respect and support the 
adjustments that these states have made to support this policy choice 
and maintain an impartial judiciary.  This is more than can be said for 
Professor McGreal.  In criticizing me (and the organized bar) for sup-
porting elective states’ attempts to secure an elected judiciary that is 
impartial and appears to be impartial, Professor McGreal fails to fully 
consider the consequences of the decision to have an elected judici-
ary, and thus it is he who fails to give due deference to these states.  
Instead, he takes Yogi Berra’s advice:  “when you come to a fork in the 
road, take it!”  If you take Yogi’s advice in this case, you can avoid get-
ting on the judicial election road.  Instead, you remain at the fork star-
ing into nondecisional space, criticizing those who are seeking to rec-
oncile the decision to have judicial elections and public 
accountability, with the core democratic values of the rule of law and 
judicial impartiality. 
The states that have chosen the judicial election road have 
learned in their travels that there are other policy choices that must 
be made to secure and protect the impartiality of an elected judiciary.  
All of these states have established judicial disciplinary mechanisms, 
generally through constitutional amendment, to enforce their codes 
of judicial conduct.  And, they have included provisions in these codes 
that seek to secure the appearance and the reality of judicial imparti-
ality through restrictions such as prohibiting candidates from prejudg-
ing cases during election campaigns.  That is, they have created a ju-
dicial structure that is different from that prescribed in the 
Constitution of the United States for the federal judiciary. 
Professor McGreal snarls at these policy choices.  He quotes dicta 
in White, where Justice Scalia denounces the “announce clause” for 
creating “conditions of state-imposed voter ignorance” to support the 
McGreal contention that restrictions on pledges, promises, and com-
mitments also “undermine judicial elections by wringing politics out 
of the political process.”  Again, I agree with the outcome in White.  
Prohibiting judicial candidates from announcing their views on all 
“disputed legal and political issues” would indeed undermine the elec-
toral process.  However, the McGreal view that the same can be said 
for restrictions on campaign pledges misses the basic fact that all this 
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restriction seeks to accomplish is to wring prejudgment out of the po-
litical process. 
The current restrictions on campaign speech are not a subterfuge 
to defeat judicial elections.  Judicial-election states that have abolished 
the announce clause post-White, but still restrict campaign pledges, 
should be able to have vibrant judicial campaigns, where issues and 
matters of interest to the electorate are debated and discussed.  Re-
cently, I witnessed an event that would support this notion.  South 
Texas College of Law hosted a “Texas Supreme Court Forum” that 
brought the three Republican incumbent justices, including the Chief 
Justice, together with their Democratic challengers.  A moderator 
from the Houston PBS station posed wide-ranging questions to the 
candidates over a fast-paced hour.  The candidates were not only 
given the opportunity to present their qualifications, but were also 
asked questions that sought, among other things:  their views on 
trends in high-court decisions, including the greater use of no-
evidence determinations to reverse jury verdicts; their analysis as to 
how they would reconcile their personal opinions when they conflict 
with legal precedent; their thoughts on when per curiam opinions are 
appropriate and their effect on Texas jurisprudence; and their feel-
ings as to whether the partisan election system for selecting Texas 
judges works well or should be changed.  At no point during the de-
bate did the candidates make prejudgment promises.  Yet, both law-
yers and nonlawyers in the audience later remarked that they not only 
learned a great deal about the candidates, but also gained greater in-
sight into the Texas judicial system from attending the debate. 
So, in response to the third McGreal concern, far from using 
campaign-speech restrictions as a subterfuge to defeat elections, these 
restrictions have been used in Texas to enhance judicial elections by 
establishing a level of discourse that not only provides voters with the 
necessary information to make meaningful decisions, but also has the 
added benefit of educating the electorate about the Texas judiciary.  
When Professor McGreal and others seek to deny a state like Texas 
this ability to reconcile judicial accountability with judicial impartial-
ity, they fail to reckon with the fact that the U.S. Constitution guaran-
tees a republican form of government to each state.  The “guarantee 
clause” does not prescribe the form of republican government but 
leaves that decision to each state.  If a state decides on an elected judi-
ciary and imposes prejudgment restrictions on that judiciary to main-
tain its impartiality, those policy choices should be respected. 
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In some of the post-White cases challenging the constitutionality of 
prejudgment restrictions on campaign speech, federal district courts 
have failed to pay deference to these policy choices.  They have struck 
down these restrictions, reflexively lumping them with the announce 
clause and concluding that they were not narrowly drawn to accom-
plish a compelling state interest.  On the other hand, all of the state 
high courts that have ruled on such restrictions post-White have up-
held them on constitutional grounds.  The difference, of course, is 
that the state courts have a greater understanding and sensitivity to 
the need these restrictions serve in securing an impartial judiciary in 
the judicial-elections regimes chosen for their states. 
II.  PREJUDGMENT PROMISES DURING JUDICIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGNS 
Professor McGreal continues to take issue with the basic premise 
that campaign restrictions are necessary to secure judicial impartiality 
in election jurisdictions, and he stubbornly refuses to understand that 
the “announce clause” restriction declared unconstitutional in White is 
qualitatively different from prejudgment restrictions.  Announcing 
one’s views on disputed legal or political issues is not a narrowly tai-
lored restriction to contain the prejudgment vice.  This prohibition 
would eliminate some speech that does not threaten to prejudge cases 
that might come before the candidate if elected and thus sweeps 
much too broadly.  In this sense the “announce clause” is like the re-
strictions declared unconstitutional in Buckley because they would do 
more than contain the vice of bribery.  A “pledges, promises, or com-
mitments” restriction, on the other hand, is tailored to contain only 
the vice of prejudgment.  It is thus a narrowly drawn restriction to 
support the compelling state interest in an impartial judiciary. 
Professor McGreal also expresses a concern over my use of the 
concept of open-mindedness in my (and the ABA’s) definition of im-
partiality.  He says that, if I meant this to connote lack of prejudg-
ment, then it is really an attack on judicial elections.  I do believe that 
“lack of prejudgment” is subsumed in the concept of open-
mindedness, but this certainly is not an attack on judicial elections.  As 
I have indicated above, a state with prejudgment restrictions on cam-
paign speech can have vibrant, informative judicial election contests.  
Apparently, Professor McGreal believes that unless candidates are 
armed with prejudgment rhetoric, judicial elections will be meaning-
less exercises.  He also adopts Justice Scalia’s cynical view that pre-
judgment campaign statements do not necessarily pose a threat to 
open-mindedness:  “one would be naive not to recognize that cam-
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paign promises are—by long democratic tradition—the least binding 
form of human commitment.”  White, 536 U.S. at 780.  Statements like 
this suggest that McGreal (and Scalia) have little or no respect for the 
policy choices that states have made in choosing to elect their judges. 
Finally, Professor McGreal rejects the notion that prejudgment 
promises are always a vice.  In this respect, he criticizes me for not dis-
tinguishing between permissible and impermissible instances of pre-
judgment.  He explains that “only prejudgment for impermissible rea-
sons” compromises impartiality. However, he never offers an example 
of an impermissible reason.  Rather, he seems to be saying that any 
prejudgment promise during a campaign is permissible as long as it is 
calculated to get the judge elected.  He even speculates about how a 
judge would be justified in breaking a prejudgment promise if public 
sentiment shifts the other way after the judge is elected.  Ultimately, 
then, Professor McGreal apparently is arguing that prejudgment 
promises are never a vice so long as they serve the ends of “political 
accountability.” 
Although judicial elections are indeed intended, at least in part, 
to make judges accountable, Professor McGreal’s analysis translates 
this into decisional accountability.  He seems to be saying that elected 
judges should always make prejudgment campaign promises and de-
cide cases after they are elected with public sentiment in mind.  This 
would turn the concept of the rule of law, a core value in the Ameri-
can democratic tradition, into a meaningless phrase.  On the contrary, 
judges should be held accountable for behaving as the public expects 
judges to behave—with integrity, impartiality, and independence. 
CONCLUSION 
The title of Professor McGreal’s Closing Statement facetiously 
suggests that if we want impartial judges (as impartiality is defined in 
the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct) we should not elect them.  
By his reckoning, efforts to secure judicial impartiality in elective ju-
risdictions through restrictions on campaign speech are doomed to be 
unconstitutional. 
A majority of the states disagree with Professor McGreal’s analysis.  
They have decided to elect all or some of their judges and have im-
posed campaign restrictions on judicial candidates to secure their im-
partiality if elected.  To the extent that these campaign restrictions are 
narrowly tailored to prohibit prejudgment promises, they should be 
upheld.  Prejudgment promises compromise a judge’s ability to be 
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impartial, and judicial impartiality is an important instrumental value 
in maintaining the rule of law in our representative democracy. 
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